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Case Comment
Tax: The Importance of Employee Involvement in
Determining Own Method of Compensation Reviewed
Respondent physicians were partners in a limited partner-
ship called Permanente Medical Group (Permanente) which
was organized in California in 1949 for the purpose of practicing
medicine. Permanente had contracted with Kaiser Foundation
Health Plan, Inc. (Kaiser)' to provide exclusive medical care
to the members of Kaiser. In return, Kaiser was to make both
monthly compensation payments directly to Permanente and
periodic payments to a retirement trust plan for the partner
and non-partner physicians of Permanente when and if such a
plan should be established. A retirement plan2 was subse-
quently established by a trust agreement between the parties.
Under this agreement, Kaiser's periodic payments were to be
made directly to a trust fund3 where they would be allocated
to the tentative trust accounts of each eligible participating phy-
sician.4 Prior to retirement, no participant was to receive any
benefits, and his interest was subject to a number of contin-
gency provisions. For example, if a participant were to termi-
nate his association with Permanente for reasons other than death
or disability before attaining the age of 65 or retire before com-
pleting 15 years of continuous service and fail to reassociate with
some other medical group serving Kaiser, he would forfeit all
benefits from the trust.5 Any forfeited amounts were to be re-
1. Kaiser is a California nonprofit corporation which provides
prepaid hospital and medical care to its dues-paying members.
2. Throughout this Comment, the retirement plan and the corres-
ponding trust fund will be characterized as unqualified under INT. REv.
CODE of 1954 § 401. Even a cursory reading of section 401 would indicate
why such a classification is justified. For example, this plan violates
the very basic provision against discrimination in favor of highly com-
pensated employees. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 401 (a) (4); Treas.
Reg. § 1.401-4 (1963).
3. The parties stipulated that "[tjhe payments which [Kaiser]
agreed to, and did make to the trust were paid solely to fund the retire-
ment plan, and were not otherwise available to [Permanentel or to the
individual members or employees thereof." Basye v. United States, 450
F.2d 109, 114 (9th Cir. 1971).
4. Any partner or employee physician of Permanente with a min-
imum of two years of service with the partnership was eligible to par-
ticipate in the retirement trust. Each participant was assigned a certain
number of units based on age, length of service, etc. On the basis of
these units, payments from Kaiser were distributed to the participants'
tenative trust accounts.
5. Benefits could also be forfeited by unreasonable refusals to
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distributed among the other beneficiaries of the trust. Once pay-
ments were made to the trust, they were thereafter committed
exclusively to the benefit of Permanente's participating physi-
cians and Kaiser could never recoup them. During the four
years at issue, neither Permanente nor any of the individual
partners included any part of Kaiser's trust payments in their
reported gross incomes.
The Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service deter-
mined that the failure to include Kaiser's trust payments in the
partnership's gross income had resulted in an understatement
of partnership income and deficiencies in the tax returns of
each of the partners for the years 1960 through 1963.7 The Com-
missioner did not contend that the partners were required to rec-
ognize income on the basis of accumulations in their tentative
trust accounts. 8 Rather, it was asserted that the direct payments
to the trust represented compensation to Permanente and were
therefore taxable to the partners on the basis of their distribu-
tive share of that partnership income. The partners paid their
assessments and filed a consolidated action for refund.0 Both
the district court' 0 and the court of appeals" disagreed with
provide consulting services to Kaiser after retirement or by providing
services to a competitor of Kaiser at any time. If Permanente were
dissolved or reorganized and more than 50 percent of the trust partici-
pants reassociated with some other medical group serving Kaiser mem-
bers, those who failed to reassociate would forfeit all benefits to the
remaining participants. If less than 50 percent reassociated, the trust
would be liquidated and the proceeds distributed to all participants.
6. A partnership is not a taxable entity, but it must file a return
with the Internal Revenue Service in compliance with INT. REV. CODE
of 1954, § 6031.
7. Permanente reported its income on the accrual basis while all
the partners used the cash basis method for reporting their income.
8. It is well established that a taxpayer who is the beneficiary
of an unqualified retirement plan which is funded by a trust is not to
be taxed for contributions made to the trust if his beneficial interests
are forfeitable. Treas. Reg. § 1.402(b)-1 (a) (1966) reads in relevant
part:
[Alny contribution made by an employer on behalf of an em-
ployee to a trust . . . not exempt under section 501 (a) [an un-
qualified plan], shall be included in income of the employee
for his taxable year during which the contribution is made if
the employee's beneficial interest in the contribution is nonfor-
feitable ....
See also S.J. Coppola v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 405 (1960); Robertson
v. Commissioner, 6 T.C. 1060 (1946).
9. See INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 7422.
10. ,Basye v. United States, 295 F. Supp. 1289 (N.D. Cal. 1968). The
district court ruled that since Permanente could not have received the
same funds as direct compensation (see note 3 supra), the payments
to the trust were not the result of anticipatory assignment of partner-
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the Commissioner's ruling that Kaiser's payments to the trust
had resulted in current income to the partnership. On appeal,
the United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
payments by Kaiser did in fact constitute accrued income to
Permanente and that the respondents, as partners, were cur-
rently taxable on their distributive share of that income. United
States v. Basye, 410 U.S. 441 (1973).
The Court's decision contains three main elements. First,
it determined that the taxability of the payments should be
ascertained by viewing the partnership as an entity and not as
a mere conduit. Second, the Court held that payments to the
trust did in fact constitute current partnership income and that
Permanente could not avoid reporting them as such merely be-
cause they were paid directly to the trust. Finally, as a conse-
quence of finding that the payments were current partnership
income, the Court concluded that the partners could not avoid
taxation on their distributive shares merely because that in-
come might never be distributed to them.
The Court's holding that the partnership was to be viewed
as a separate entity112 for the purpose of computing current part
nership income would hardly merit discussion were it not for the
-apparent confusion in the two lower courts on this issue.' 3 Al-
though there is little case law on point, numerous commentaries
have invariably concluded that a partnership should be viewed
ship income and thus were not reportable as income to the partnership.
Alternatively, the court held that the individual partners were the tax-
payers and could not be taxed unless they themselves were chargeable
with income under ordinary tax law. Using this approach, it was as-
serted that the contingent and forfeitable nature of each partner's inter-
est would not justify the imposition of a current tax.
11. Basye v. United States, 450 F.2d 109 (9th Cir. 1971). The rul-
ing of the court of appeals was identical to the decision below except
that the second alternative holding was omitted.
12. Under the entity approach, the existence of an obligation to re-
port any given item as income is determined by viewing the part-
nership as an entity separate from the individual partners. In this way,
items of income which may be forfeitable with respect to any individual
partner but are not forfeitable with respect to the partnership as a
whole constitute reportable income. The conduit approach, on the other
hand, would view these same items of potential income as merely flow-
ing through the partnership so that an item which is not attributable
to any one partner as current income would not be reportable as part-
nership income either. See 6 IND. L. REv. 537, 540 n.17 (1973).
13. The issue is discussed by the appellate court, 450 F.2d at 113-
15, and by the district court, 295 F. Supp. at 1295. The Supreme Court
found it odd that this issue should even be discussed at this late date.
410 U.S. at 448 n.8.
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as an entity when computing its income.14 In any case, section
703 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code'0 makes it quite clear that
the Court has only reiterated what was already the established
law.16
The third component of the Court's ruling concerning the
taxability of undistributed partnership income to the individual
partners is as unmomentous as the first and merits only a lim-
ited discussion. The fundamental case law in this area was
succinctly articulated as long ago as 1938 in Heiner v. Mellon,"
where the Court said:
14. See, e.g., Davis, Partners and Partnerships: Determination of
Tax Liability Under the 1954 Code, 32 TAXES 964 (1954); Hauser, Part-
ners and Partnerships: Contributions, Distributions and Transfers Un-
der the 1954 Code, 32 TAXES 954 (1954); Wolfman, Level for Determin-
ing Character of Partnership Income-"Entity" v. "Conduit" Principle
in Partnership Taxation, 19 N.Y.U. 19rH INST. ON FED. TAx. 287 (1961).
See also Rev. Rul. 144, 1953-2 Cum. BULL. 212; 6 J. MERTENS, LAW OF
FEDERAL INcoME TAXATION § 35.01 (Rev. 1968).
15. INT. Ruv. CODE of 1954, § 703 (a) provides in relevant part: "The
taxable income of a partnership shall be computed in the same manner
as in the case of an individual. .. ."
16. The basis for the confusion seems to be that those who suggest
the conduit approach rely on INT. Rv. CODE of 1954, § 702(b) which
provides:
The character of any item of income, gain, loss, deduction, or
credit included in a partner's distributive share [of partnership
income] . . .shall be determined as if such item were realized
directly from the source from which realized by the partnership
The advocates of the conduit approach evidently interpret this section
to mean that the characterization of an item of income as income to
the partners is to be determined on the assumption that the item is be-
ing received directly from the source. If, for example, the income is
in the form of forfeitable benefits from a trust (as in the Basye case),
it should then not be characterized as income to the partner. Such a
reading of the statute is plausible but certainly incorrect. The statute
is meant to be interpreted so that once income is realized by the part-
nership and the partners' distributable shares are determined, the
individual partners will stand in the shoes of the partnership when
characterizing the items of income on their respective tax returns. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.702-1 (b) (1966). This idea is illustrated in the Court's
opinion in Basye:
For this purpose [determination of partnership income], then,
the partnership is regarded as an independently recognizable
entity apart from the aggregate of its partners. Once its income
is ascertained and reported, its existence may be disregarded
since each partner must pay a portion of the total income as
if the partnership were merely an agent or conduit through
which the income passed.
410 U.S. at 448.
17. 304 U.S. 271 (1938). In this case, taxpayers were the surviving
partners of a three-man partnership. In the process of liquidating the
partnership, the taxpayers accrued income and were forced to pay tax
on their distributable shares even though state law prevented them from
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The tax is thus imposed upon the partner's proportionate share
of the net income of the partnership, and the fact that it might
not be currently distributable, whether by agreement of the
parties or by operation of law, is not material.' s
Once Kaiser's payments to the trust are characterized as re-
portable partnership income, the law conclusively establishes
the individual partner's tax liability for his distributive share
whether or not he ever receives it.10 The Court's decision on
this issue is noteworthy only in that it affirms Treasury Regu-
lation 1.702-1 (a) .20
The second element of the Court's decision, however, repre-
sents an important delineation of a taxpayer's liability for in-
come he has been prevented from receiving because of contrac-
tual limitations. The Court based its conclusion of taxpayer lia-
bility on the concept of anticipatory assignment of income. This
doctrine requires that the tax on income must be paid by the in-
dividual who earns it2 ' and "that the tax (can] not be escaped
receiving their shares until the liquidation was complete. It should also
be noted that they could quite possibly have incurred future losses
which might have consumed all the partnership income on which they
had been taxed.
18. Id. at 281.
19. This concept has been consistently applied. See Hulbert v.
Commissioner, 227 F.2d 399 (7th Cir. 1955); Bell v. Commissioner, 219
F.2d 442 (5th Cir. 1955); Stewart v. United States, 263 F. Supp. 451 (SM.
N.Y. 1967); Freudmann v. Commissioner, 10 T.C. 775 (1948). See also
Stoumen v. Commissioner, 208 F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 1953). The respondents
argued, however, that the phrase in the 1939 Code on which most
of the decisions on this issue were based is not found in the 1954
Code, and that it is therefore no longer justifiable to tax partners on
all of their distributive share of partnership income regardless of un-
certainties as to the eventual receipt of those shares. See Brief for Re-
spondents at 10, 33, United States v. Basye, 410 U.S. 441 (1973). How-
ever, the respondents' argument is quickly disposed of by the fact that
the deleted phrase is now found in Treas. Reg. § 1.702-1 (a) (1966), the
relevant portion of -which reads as follows:
Each partner is required to take into account separately in his
return his distributive share, whether or not distributed, of each
class or item of partnership, income ....
If the Court had allowed the partners to postpone the reporting of the
trust payments until their individual rights to such payments became
vested, it would have thrown the law of partnership taxation into utter
chaos. All partnership agreements would soon provide for various
items of partnership income to be held in suspension for income tax
purposes until the rights of the individual partners would vesL This
would permit a substantial tax advantage clearly beyond the intent of
the Court or the Code. See Teschner, Basye Projected: Fringe Benefits
and the Supreme Court, 51 TAxEs 324, 334 (1973).
20. Treas. Reg. § 1.702-1(a) (1966). The phraseology of this regu-
lation is the basic component of most decisions in the area. See note
19 supra.
21. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733 (1949); Na-
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by anticipatory arrangements and contracts however skilfully
devised to prevent the salary when paid from vesting even for
a second in the man who earned it. ' '22 In Basye, the application
of the anticipatory assignment concept required that income
earned by Permanente not go unreported merely because the
trust agreement stipulated that it was to be paid directly to the
trust rather than to Permanente itself. The Court refused to
even consider the argument that the individual partners, rather
than Permanente, had or would have earned the income through
their long term service to Kaiser.23 Instead, the Court held that
Permanente had unquestionably earned the income being distrib-
uted by Kaiser in the form of the trust payments. 24
Merely ruling that Permanente had earned the income, how-
ever, was not enough to dispose of the case. In Commissioner
v. First Security Bank of Utah, 2 5 the Court had recognized that
tional Carbide Corp. v. Commissioner, 336 U.S. 422 (1949); Commis-
sioner v. Harmon, 323 U.S. 44 (1944); Burnet v. Leininger, 285 U.S. 136
(1932).
22. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 115 (1930). The taxpayer in this
case had entered into a contract and assigned one-half of all his current
interests plus one-half of all future interests to his wife. The question
litigated was whether the assignment of current income to the wife
could successfully excuse the taxpayer from reporting the income in his
annual tax return. The Court disallowed such tax avoidance.
23. This argument was in fact used by the appellate court in its
decision:
The payments are to be viewed not as compensation for im-
mediately past medical services but as compensation for the
continued, long-term services of individual physicians. When
the transaction is viewed in this light the partnership becomes
a mere agent contracting on behalf of its members for payments
to the trust for their ultimate benefit, rather than a principal
which itself realizes taxable income.
450 F.2d at 115.
As contingent beneficiaries of an unqualified retirement plan, the
partners would have escaped current taxation under Treas. Reg. § 1.402
(b)-1 (a) (1966). See note 30 infra.
24. 410 U.S. at 449.
25. 405 U.S. 394 (1972). The taxpayer in this case was a bank of-
fering insurance to its borrowers. Under 12 U.S.C. § 92 (1916), national
banks were authorized to act as insurance agents when located in places
having a population not exceeding 5000. By negative implication, the
courts have held that this provision prohibited such dealing in places
of more than 5000 inhabitants. See Saxon v. Georgia Ass'n of Independ-
ent Ins. Agents, Inc., 399 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1968); Commissioner v.
Morris Trust, 367 F.2d 794 (4th Cir. 1966). Although section 92 has been
repealed, the Comptroller of the Currency still considers that section
to be effective as of 1972. See 405 U.S. at 401 n.12. As a bank, the
taxpayer was thus prohibited from receiving sales commissions from the
insurance carrier which was an affiliated corporation. The Court, per
Justice Powell, held that since the bank could not legally receive the
1176 [Vol. 58:1171
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a taxpayer need not report income which it had earned if it
was prohibited by statute from receiving the income. Also, the
Court in that case cited with approval 26 Teschner v. Commis-
sioner,27 in which the Tax Court had held that money earned by
the taxpayer was not includable in taxable income because a con-
tractual stipulation prevented the taxpayer from directly receiv-
ing the income.
In the area of anticipatory assignment law, the First Secu-
ity Bank case and the Court's endorsement of Teschner seemed
to limit the strict application of the concept that income must
always be taxed to the person who earns it. On the basis of
these two recent decisions, it appeared that a taxpayer would not
be required to report compensatory income which he could never
receive because of either a contractual provision or a statutory
limitation.28 Yet the Court reached the opposite result in Basye
where the agreement clearly -prohibited Permanente from ever
directly receiving the trust payments.
The operative distinction between Basye and the First Se-
curity Bank and Teschner cases is that in the latter cases the
taxpayers in no way bargained for the legal limitations which
prevented the direct receipt of compensation. In Basye, how-
ever, Permanente was involved in establishing the trust agree-
ment which prevented it from receiving the trust payments di-
rectly. This factual distinction was crucial to the Court's de-
cision. Since Permanente was a party to the trust agreement
under which it was prevented from receiving the trust payments
directly, it was necessary to report those payments to the trust
as current partnership income.2 9 Thus, the decision in Basye
indicates that anticipatory assignment of income exists as a
matter of law whenever the taxpayer is not completely independ-
ent of the circumstances which deprive him of the right to receive
compensation directly, and that such compensation must be re-
commissions, it could not be forced to report the commissions as earned
income.
26. 405 U.S. at 406 n.22.
27. 38 T.C. 1003 (1962). The taxpayer in this case had entered a
contest which precluded him from being the recipient of any prizes
awarded but allowed him to compete if he would name a child under
17 to be the recipient of any prizes he might win. The court held that
since the taxpayer never had and never would have the right to receive
the prizes himself, it would be unfair to require him to report such
prizes as income.
28. See Teschner, First Security Bank of Utah: Taxpayer Disabil-
ity and the Supreme Court, 50 TAXEs 260 (1972).
29. 410 U.S. at 451.
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ported as current income80 regardless of the tax-payer's apparent
inability 3' to receive the compensation directly.
32
The Court's holding may be explained in either of two ways.
The inappropriate explanation would be that the Court was per-
suaded by the Government that to find for the taxpayers would
disrupt the statutory limitations on unqualified retirement plans
under sections 401 through 404 of the Internal Revenue Code.8
The Government had argued3 4 that since this retirement plan
30. It should be noted that if the respondents had not been the
members of a partnership but had contracted with Kaiser as a group
of employees, they could have set up the identical retirement plan and
would only have been taxed when they actually received nonforfeitable
interests in the trust. Treas. Reg. § 1.402(b)-l (a) (1966). See Robert-
son v. Commissioner, 6 T.C. 1060 (1946), where the petitioner was a par-
ticipant in an unqualified retirement plan and had a forfeitable interest
in the plan's trust fund which was funded by the employer. If the peti-
tioner were to forfeit his interest, it was to be redistributed among the
other members of the plan. In no way could the employer recoup the
trust payments once they were made. Relying on INT. REV. CODE of
1939, § 165(c), the predecessor of Treas. Reg. § 1.402(b) (1966), the
court ruled that the taxpayer was not taxable on the contributions as
long as they were actually forfeitable. See also Rev. Rul. 67-449, 1967-2
Cum. BULL. 173.
31. That Permanente could not have received the payments in any
other form is apparent from the stipulated facts. See note 3 supra.
32. This conclusion seems justified on the basis of the following
statements in the Court's opinion:
The [appellate] court's reasoning seems to be that, before
the partnership could be found to have received income, there
must be proof that "Permanente agreed to accept less direct
compensation from Kaiser in exchange for the retirement plan
payments." [450 F.2d] at 114-115. Apart from the inherent dif-
ficulty of adducing such evidence, we know of no authority im-
posing this burden upon the Government. Nor do we believe
that the guiding principle of Lucas v. Earl may be so easily
circumvented. Kaiser's motives for making payments are ir-
relevant to the determination whether those amounts may fairly
be viewed as compensation for services rendered. Neither does
Kaiser's apparent insistence upon payment to the trust deprive
the agreed contributions of their character as compensation. The
Government need not prove that the taxpayer had complete and
unrestricted power to designate the manner and form in which
his income is received.
410 U.S. at 451-52.
33. There is some evidence that the Court was swayed by this ar-
gument:
We may assume, especially in view of the relatively unfavor-
able tax status of self-employed persons with respect to the tax
treatment of retirement plans, that many partnerships would
eagerly accept conditions similar to those prescribed by this
trust in consideration for tax-deferral benefits of the sort sug-
gested here.
410 U.S. at 452. It should be noted, however, that the unfavorable sta-
tus referred to by the Court concerns qualified plans under section 401
and is not applicable to unqualified plans.
34. See 41 U.S.L.W. 3338 (1972).
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was admittedly an unqualified plan, it should not be allowed
one of the principal benefits of the qualified plans-deferment
of taxes for the beneficiaries of the trust. However, beneficia-
ries of an unqualified trust must only include as income their
share of contributions which are nonforfeitable.35 The part-
ners' beneficial interests in the trust were certainly forfeitable.
Therefore, it could be argued that to allow each partner to defer
the reporting of the trust benefits as current income until his
respective rights became vested would in fact be compatible with
the statutory provisions concerning deferred compensation
plans.38
It is more likely that the Court ruled as it did in order to
avoid setting a precedent that would prove to be unworkable.
As noted earlier, the factual distinction between this case and
the First Security Bank and Teschner cases was that Perman-
ente was actually involved in negotiating the agreement which
prevented it from ever receiving the compensation directly. Cer-
tainly a taxpayer should not be forced to report compensation it
could never actually receive.37 In a fact situation similar to
Basye, however, where the taxpayer is actually involved in the
arrangement which prevents it from directly receiving the com-
pensation, the problem becomes one of practicality. It would
be unlikely that the courts could ever determine from the avail-
able facts whether the taxpayer actually could not have re-
ceived the compensation directly or whether it instead merely
agreed to have the compensation paid to someone or something
else in order to avoid taxation. The Court quite clearly saw
35. See Treas. Reg. § 1.402(b)-1 (1966).
36. Id. The reader may be confused at this point as to what tax
advantages result from having a qualified retirement plan and trust
fund if the unqualified plans result in tax deferral for the beneficiaries.
The basic advantage is the simultaneous occurrence of tax deferral for
the beneficiaries and current tax deductibility for the employer. If the
beneficiaries' interests under an unqualified plan are forfeitable, they
may escape current taxation under section 402(b), but the employer
will not be allowed a deduction for his contribution. See Treas. Reg.§ 1.404(a)-12 (1960) which reads in relevant part:
[I]f an amount is paid during the taxable year to a trust or
under a plan and the employee's rights to such amounts are
forfeitable at the time the amount is paid, no deduction is al-
lowable for such amount for any taxable year.
For a discussion of why the Court held that the individual partners
were currently taxable on the clearly forfeitable trust payments despite
the apparent sanction of Treas. Reg. § l.402(b)-l(a) (1966), see note
19 supra.
37. As indicated in note 3 supra, Permanente had no choice but
to receive the compensation in the form of payments directly to the
trust.
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the need to react at the first indication that a theory of tax avoid-
ance was being developed that would effectively destroy all an-
ticipatory assignment law,3 law which the Court considers to
be the "cornerstone of our graduated income tax system."' 9
In Basye the Court's conclusion of bargained-for compensa-
tion was predicated on the fact that Permanente had "prior in-
volvement" with the trust arrangement which resulted in a di-
version of partnership compensation to the trust.40 It is in-
teresting to consider the extent to which this argument of
prior-bargaining-therefore-taxation could be invoked in other
areas of tax law.
BASYE AS APPLIED TO FRINGE BENEFIT PROGRAMS
Fringe benefit programs appear to be one analogous situa-
tion where this concept could have some application. Perman-
ente's prior involvement with the trust agreement was held to
be sufficient bargaining for the disposition of its compensation
to result in currently reportable income; similarly, the employee
who bargains with the employer for the terms of his employ-
ment contract might also be forced to report compensation di-
rectly or indirectly conferred under that contract. However,
most major fringe benefit programs are already directly regu-
lated in the Internal Revenue Code. For example, stock option
plans, 41 annuities,4 2 health and accident plans,43 and group-term
insurance plans44 are all explicitly controlled under the Code.
One type of fringe benefit program which has not yet been
explicitly circumscribed by the Code is the "college benefit
38. The Court itself contributed to the development of such a the-
ory when it stated:
We know of no decision of this Court wherein a person has
been found to have taxable income that he did not receive and
that he was prohibited from receiving.
Commissioner v. First Security Bank of Utah, 405 U.S. 394, 403 (1972).
When applying the doctrine of assignment of income, this language ap-
peared to create a factual question as to whether a taxpayer is actu-
ally prohibited from receiving the income. The Court in Basye obvi-
ously concluded that it would have been a fatal error to rest the deter-
mination of taxability on a factual issue where only the taxpayer would
have direct access to the facts.
39. 410 U.S. at 450.
40. "The partnership earned the income and, as a result of arm's-
length bargaining with Kaiser, was responsible for its diversion into the
trust fund." Id. at 451.
41. See INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §§ 421-25.
42. See Id., § 72.
43. See Id., § 105.
44. See Id., § 79.
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plan." These programs are funded by employer contributions to
an educational trust which is to be used to subsidize the college
education of employees' children. The direct compensation of
the employee is in no way affected by the number of children
covered under the plan and supposedly "no employee has an
option to receive anything of value in lieu of his child's eligi-
bility under the Plan. '45
At least one commentator has suggested that the concept of
prior-bargaining-therefore-taxation is completely irrelevant to
college benefit plans since the employer's trust contributions
should not be characterized as compensation in the first place.4"
Rather, they should be viewed merely as a "corporate program
adopted primarily and as a matter of fact for the best business
interests of an employer" which has the "incidental result of
benefiting employees in noncompensatory ways."4 7 However,
the courts are more likely to adopt the attitude that "[w]hen
an individual is attracted to a job or motivated to remain in his
job by the promise of certain fringe benefits, such benefits are
prima facie compensatory. ' 48  The Basye Court seems to have
ratified this latter approach by refusing to even consider that
the trust payments were anything but compensation for ser-
vices performed by Permanente. 49
In deciding whether college benefit plans result in currently
taxable income, it is first necessary to determine as to whom
these trust payments are "compensatory benefits." Certainly,
any attempt to make such a determination before individual
rights to the use of the funds have been exercised would have
to be based on rather arbitrary criteria. Even if it could be
determined that this type of plan is a compensatory benefit to
a certain employee or group of employees, the use of Basye as a
precedent is not without its problems. The argument in Basje
was based on the assumption that Permanente did in fact bar-
gain, -as a matter of law, to accept the trust payments in lieu of
more direct compensation. 50 Such an assumption was probably
justified in view of the facts involved in that case, but it may
45. Teschner, Basye Projected: Fringe Benefits and the Supreme
Court, 51 TAxEs 324, 340 (1973).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 340.
48. Blake, Non-Cash Fringe Benefits, 18 N.Y.U. 18TH INST. ON FED.
TAX. 879, 884 (1960). In support of this type of quid pro quo analysis
of compensation, see Bingler v. Johnson, 394 U.S. 741 (1969).
49. See note 40 supra.
50. See note 32 supra.
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not be appropriate in situations where the facts are not so com-
pelling. Where top executives are involved, the assumption that
they do in fact bargain for the method of compensation would
seem to be at least a supportable position, and the resultant tax
liability according to the assignment of income theories devel-
oped in Basye would not appear to be grossly unjustified. In
the case of lower echelon employees whose bargaining power is
admittedly diminished with respect to modes of compensation,
the assumption of bargained-for compensation becomes less and
less tenable.5' With respect to fringe benefit programs in which
persons other than the employee himself are beneficiaries, the
employer's payments should result in currently taxable income
to the employee only in situations where it is evident that the
employee has bargained for the establishment of a fringe bene-
fit program with the intent to divert his compensation else-
where.5 2
BASYE AS APPLIED TO DEFERRED
COMPENSATION PLANS
Although the issue in Basye was clearly one of assignment
of income, it is possible that this case could also affect situa-
tions where it appears that a cash basis taxpayer would have
received compensation currently if he had not decided to enter
into an unfunded deferred payment contract. This situation
traditionally involves a question of when63 the income is tax-
51. For a more detailed discussion of this type of fringe benefit
program with respect to its compensatory aspects, see Geske, Scholar-
ships for Dependents of Company Employees: Tax Problems of Com-
pany Foundations, 51 TAXES 21 (1973).
52. It is interesting to note that Treas. Reg. § 1.117-3(a) (1960)
provides that:
If an educational institution maintains or participates in a plan
whereby the tuition of a child of a faculty member of such
institution is remitted by any other participating educational
institution attended by such child, the amount of the tuition
so remitted shall be considered to be an amount received as
a scholarship.
Although this type of arrangement could have been characterized as
compensatory with respect to the parent-faculty member, under a strict
application of the quid pro quo analysis (see note 48 supra and ac-
companying text) the Treasury has instead deemed it appropriate to
classify the free tuition as a scholarship under INT. REv. CODE of 1954,
§ 117.
53. It is necessary to distinguish situations involving the question
of what is income, which are controlled by the doctrine of "economic
benefit" or "cash equivalence." This is usually not a problem with re-
gard to unfunded deferred compensation contracts. See Rev. Rul. 60-
31, 1960-1 CUM. BULL. 174, 177, which states:
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able (constructive receipt) rather than a question of to whom
it is taxable (assignment of income), r ' but the courts have
tended to integrate these two theories. Consequently, the dis-
tinction is often obscured in judicial opinions. Thus, it is quite
possible that some courts will attempt to answer the question
of when a taxpayer should be taxed on income earned under
an unfunded deferred payment contract by using assignment
of income theories developed in Basye, despite the apparent dis-
tinction between the two legal theories involved.ss
Deferred compensation plans can generally be separated
into two major groupings: funded and unfunded. A funded
plan requires that the employer currently set aside funds to
meet his future obligations under the deferred payment arrange-
ment. This is normally done by contributing to a trust or es-
crow fund that is later distributed to the employees according
to the schedule incorporated into the plan. Since sections 401
through 404 of the Internal Revenue Code have already estab-
lished a framework to control the taxation of such contributions,
it is most unlikely that the ruling in Basye will have any signifi-
cant effect on funded plans.
In the area of unfunded deferred compensation contracts,
however, the standards of taxation dictated by the doctrine of
constructive receipt are not nearly so well defined. The concept
underlying this doctrine is basically one of control.50 Treasury
regulations provide that:
Income although not actually reduced to a taxpayer's possession
is constructively received by him in the taxable year during
A mere promise to pay, not represented by notes or secured
in any way is not regarded as a receipt of income within the
intendment of the cash receipts and disbursements method.
54. See Rothschild & Ness, IRS Confines Hicks Case and Sanctions
Deferred Compensation Choices, 19 J. OF TAx. 216, 217 (1963).
55. See 2 J. MEmmNS, LAW OF FDERA INco E TAxATiON § 10.01
(Rev. 1968):
[T]he theory of constructive receipt is properly applicable to
those situations involving the question as to when income is
received. ... [The] latter cases [involving assignment of in-
come] really seek a determination as to who is the tax-payer
with respect to a particular item of income rather than when
a particular item of income is to be reported by and taxed to
the taxpayer.
56. A failure to recognize constructive receipt of income as
income realized would open the door to avoidance and possible
evasion. A taxpayer should not have the right to select the
year in which to reduce income to possession. It is now well
settled that income which is subject to a taxpayer's unfettered
command and which he is free to enjoy at his own option is
taxed to him whether he sees fit to enjoy it or not.
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which it is credited to his account, set apart for him, or other-
wise made available so that he may draw upon it at any time
.57
To the extent that Basye speaks to this type of control, the case
may well be used as a precedent in the area of unfunded de-
ferred compensation contracts."8
In Basye, the Court held that Permanente had bargained
for the trust agreement which required payments to be made
directly to the trust. As a result, Permanente was held to have
had sufficient control of the payments to require that they ke
reported as current income.5 Although the Court did not ex-
plicitly evaluate the type of control required, it is clear from
the opinion that something less than complete control was suf-
ficient:
The Government need not prove that the taxpayer had complete
and unrestricted power to designate the manner and form in
which his income is received .... We think it clear . . . that
the tax laws permit no such easy road to tax avoidance or de-
ferment. 60
The apparent analogy to be drawn between Basye and the situ-
ation in which the taxpayer bargains for an unfunded deferred
payment contract is deceivingly simple. Just as Permanente's
bargaining for the method of its compensation was sufficient
control to result in taxable income as payments were made to
the trust, a taxpayer who bargains for the method of deferment
or for the initiation of the deferment plan should also report
such deferments as current income when they would have other-
wise been received. A concern with the tax effect of having
employees exercise control over the decision to defer their com-
pensation is not foreign to this area of tax law. This was em-
phasized in one commentary as follows:
Taxpayers and their representatives often labored earnestly to
demonstrate that the deferred pay arrangement served the
needs of the employee . . . or that it was insisted on by the
employer. 61
57. Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2(a) (1964).
58. This would not be the first time that theories developed in an-
ticipatory assignment law have been used to establish the control nec-
essary to apply constructive receipt law. See Hicks v. United States, 314
F.2d 180, 183-84 (1963).
59. Permanente's agreement with Kaiser, whereby a portion of
the partnership compensation was deflected to the retirement
fund, is certainly within the ambit of Lucas v. Earl.
410 U.S. at 451.
60. Id. at 452.
61. Delson & Broser, Sugar Ray's Deferred Pay Contract Holds
Door Open for Earnings Postponement, 23 J. oF TAx. 80 (1965).
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At this point, several questions remain unanswered. The
degree of control required before the doctrine of constructive
receipt can be applied has not yet exactly been determined. The
discussion in Basye concerning the tax effects of the taxpayer's
bargaining for the contract that controls the method of compen-
sation might seriously affect deferred compensation law. Fin-
ally, it remains to be seen whether any such effect is justified.
Before the doctrine of constructive receipt can be applied,
it has always been required that the taxpayer's control of the
income be subject to no substantial limitations.6 2 In a situation
where the cash basis taxpayer contracts with his employer prior
to performance to defer payment for services, there is apparently
no basis for applying the constructive receipt doctrine.0 3 At the
contract date, the income has not been earned; thus, the employee
has no current right to receipt. When the income is earned,
the right to receipt has already been postponed under the terms
of the contract.
However, the degree of control the taxpayer may have in
arranging such deferment contracts while still avoiding the ap-
plication of constructive receipt remains uncertain. A number
of cases have discussed in depth the importance of the taxpayer's
involvement in the deferral arrangement and/or his intent to
defer or avoid taxes.64 Although none of these cases found
the extent of the taxpayer's involvement, in and of itself, a
viable criterion on which to base the application of constructive
receipt, 5 they have precipitated a good deal of discussion con-
cerning how much taxpayer control is permissible.0 In Hicks
v. United States, 67 the court ruled that the "power to dispose of
62. Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2 (a) (1964) provides:
[I] ncome is not constructively received if the taxpayer's control
of its receipt is subject to substantial limitations or restrictions.
63. See Dohan, Employee Income Realization From Deferred Com-
pensation, 21 N.Y.U. 21ST INST. ox FED. TAX. 497, 513-14 (1963).
64. See Cowden v. Commissioner, 289 F.2d 20 (5th Cir. 1961);
Drysdale v. Commissioner, 277 F.2d 413 (6th Cir. 1960); Williams v.
United States. 219 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1955); Commissioner v. Oates, 207
F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1953).
65. See, e.g., Dohan, supra note 63, at 518: "The Fifth Circuit, in
reversing Cowden [289 F.2d 20 (5th Cir. 1961)] has held that the will-
ingness and ability of the payor to pay is not to be considered, and
that a tax avoidance motive should be a neutral factor."
66. See, e.g., Knight, Income Tax Consequences of Nonqualified
Deferred Compensation: A Recapitulation, 21 TAx LAW. 163 (1968);
Lurie, Analysis of Problems Created by IRS' New Stress on Contingen-
cies in Nonqualified Plans, 28 J. op TAx. 258 (1968); Rothschild & Ness,
supra note 51.
67. 314 F.2d 180 (4th Cir. 1963). The taxpayer was given the op-
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income as he wishes results in taxable income to the holder of
that power." 68  This apparently established some outer limits
on the allowable taxpayer control over deferral arrangements,
but the case has little precedential value because of a subsequent
Revenue Ruling6 which explicitly limited Hicks to its quite
distinctive facts. Also, in Commissioner v. Basila,70 the Tax
Court stated:
The argument that the principle of constructive receipt comes
into action with the mere possession of the power (as opposed
to the right) to receive funds extends the principle to unwar-
ranted limits and has been rejected by the courts on numerous
occasions.71
On this issue of permissible taxpayer control, the Treasury
takes the position that it will not administer the statute by
"speculating whether the payor would have been willing to
agree to an earlier payment. '7 2  However, this same ruling
stated that "in each case involving a deferral of compensation
a determination of whether the doctrine of constructive receipt
is applicable must be made upon the basis of the specific factual
situation involved.17 3  This apparently left open the question
concerning the applicability of the constructive receipt doctrine
when it was clear beyond speculation that the taxpayer would
have received current compensation were it not for the de-
ferment contract.74 In 1965, however, in Robinson v. Commis-
sioner,75 the importance of the taxpayer's power (as opposed to
right) to receive compensation sooner than contracted for under
an unfunded deferred payment contract was largely discredited
as an effective criterion governing the application of construc-
tive receipt.70 In this case, the deferred payment contract was
tion of deferring compensation or receiving the income currently. Al-
though he exercised his option in favor of deferral prior to the date
on which the income was payable, the court held that he had construc-
tively received the income.
68. Id. at 185.
69. Rev. Rul. 63-180, 1963-2 CuM. BULL. 189.
70. 36 T.C. 111 (1961).
71. Id. at 117.
72. Rev. Rul. 63-31, 1960-1 CuIm. BuLL. 174, 178.
73. Id.
74. See Knight, supra note 66, at 171.
75. 44 T.C. 20 (1965).
76. It is important to note that the Government does not base
its constructive-receipt argument upon the fact that IBC
[payor] was willing to enter into a contract on July 31, 1957,
to make payments in full to petitioner immediately after the
Sept. 23, 1957, fight. Indeed the Government refers to example
(3) in Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174, implying that a bona
fide contract providing for deferred payments would be given
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clearly entered into at the behest of the taxpayer;7" yet the
Government failed to even argue that such control of the timing
of compensation should result in constructive receipt.78 Thus,
the logical conclusion is that a bona fide unfunded contract
which is legally binding on the parties and provides for deferred
payment will be given tax effect 79 if entered into prior to the
attainment of a "right" to receive income currently.80 This is
true regardless of the purpose for such deferment 81 and/or the
existence of the apparent ability to receive that income at an
earlier time.
2
Despite this prior authority, the Court in Basye quite clearly
held that the partners could not defer receipt of income for tax
purposes by contracting away in advance their right to receive
direct payment. In reaching this conclusion, the Court stated
that the Government need not prove complete control over the
effect notwithstanding that the obligor might have been willing
to contract to make such payments at an earlier time.
Id. at 36. See also McDonald, Deferred Compensation: Conceptual
Astigmatism, 24 TAx L. Rav. 201, 220 (1969).
77. To be sure, IBC probably would have been willing to pay over
to petitioner the full amount due him in 1957. Robinson v. Commis-
sioner, 44 T.C. 20, 37 (1965).
78. It is interesting to note that in the case of qualified pension
and profit-sharing plans, the IRS has ruled several times that the mere
power of a participant to make an election to defer payment of his share
beyond the time that it would otherwise be payable does not result in
the characterization of such payments as "made available" and hence
taxable to him under constructive receipt law. See Rev. Rul. 57-260,
1957-1 Cum BuLL. 164; Rev. Rul. 55-423, 1955-1 Cum BuLL. 41.
79. The proper test would appear to be whether the arrange-
ment was a valid one from the standpoint of a binding agree-
ment and one court of appeals [5th Cir.] has flatly rejectedthe
suggestions that there is any further "business purpose" gloss
on the doctrine.
Knight, supra note 66, at 174.
80. Under the decided cases... and Revenue Ruling 60-31 and
private rulings issued by the Service, an employee is, in general,
allowed to elect deferment prior to the time he is entitled to
be paid without adverse tax consequences.
McDonald, supra note 76, at 236.
81. See note 79 supra.
82. On the other hand, it must be recognized that a taxpayer
has a perfect legal right to stipulate that he is not to be paid
until some subsequent year, or that the payments are to be
spread out over a number of years. Where such a stipulation
is entered into between buyer and seller prior to the time when
the seller has acquired an absolute and unconditional right to
receive payment, and where the stipulation amounts to a
binding contract between the parties so that the buyer has a
legal right to refuse payment except in accordance with the
terms of the agreement, then the doctrine of constructive receipt
does not apply, and the taxpayer is not required to report the
income until the same is actually received by him.
Oliver v. United States, 193 F. Supp. 930, 933 (E.D. Ark. 1961).
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manner in which income is to be received. 83 Instead, the fact
that the partners had bargained for the deferment was held to
result in current taxability for that compensation.8 4  It must
be remembered, however, that Basye basically involved a ques-
tion of who was the appropriate entity to report the income8"
rather than when a given taxpayer was to be taxed on a particu-
lar item of compensation. 6 In the typical anticipatory assign-
ment of earned income case, the question of who is the proper
taxpayer does not usually involve the question of control but
instead deals with the simple factual question of whether a
particular item is compensation to the taxpayer.8 7 If the com-
pensation question is answered in the affirmative, the court
need only invoke the well-established doctrine that the tax on
compensation must be paid by the person who earns it.88 The
discussion of the requisite control in Basye was merely a re-
sponse to the argument that the case fit within the ambit of
the limited exception to the prohibition against assignment of
compensation discussed earlier with respect to the First Security
Bank and Teschner cases.8 9 Giving effect to Basye within the
area of unfunded deferred compensation contracts would be an
inappropriate application of assignment of income law. Such
an application would not only be in derogation of the established
law in the area but would also threaten the integrity of the en-
tire cash reporting system.
Unlike the typical assignment of compensation case where
the assignor is attempting to use mere form to avoid the effects
83. 410 U.S. at 452.
84. See note 40 supra.
85. The entity earning the income . . . cannot avoid taxation
by entering into a contractual arrangement whereby that in-
come is diverted to some other person or entity. Such arrange-
ments, known to the tax law as "anticipatory assignments of
income," have frequently been held ineffective as means of
avoiding tax liability.
410 U.S. at 449-50.
86. Although the issue of when the partners must report their re-
spective shares of partnership income was involved in Basye, it is con-
trolled by Treas. Reg. § 1.702-1 (1966) which is completely outside the
area of constructive receipt law.
87. See, e.g., note 75 supra and accompanying text; Commissioner
v. Culbertson, 337 U.S. 733 (1949); Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 211
(1940); Burnet v. Leininger, 285 U.S. 136 (1932); Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S.
111 (1930). See also the earlier discussion of fringe benefit programs
with respect to the application of assignment of income at text accom-
panying notes 40-52 supra, where the critical question was whether the
benefit was compensatory.
88. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114-15 (1930).
89. See text accompanying notes 25-28 supra.
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of the graduated tax system,90 the taxpayer who defers com-
pensation under an unfunded deferred compensation contract
is actually incurring a substantial disadvantage.91 Not only does
he surrender his present right to use such funds, but he also
runs the risk of not being able to collect from the employer
when the compensation becomes payable. An even more im-
portant reason to resist the application of the Basye concept of
prior-bargaining-therefore-taxation to constructive receipt law,
however, is the need to preserve the integrity of the cash basis
method of reporting income. Predicating the application of the
constructive receipt doctrine on the fact that the taxpayer could
have retained the right to receive income currently can only re-
sult in a judicial nightmare. The courts would find it difficult
to produce consistent and just results since they would be
forced to rely on inference and supposition.
90. See, e.g., Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122 (1940); Burnet v.
Leininger, 285 U.S. 136 (1932); Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
91. It must be remembered that the concept under examination is
the degree of control necessary to precipitate the application of the con-
structive receipt doctrine. Even if the unfunded promise of future pay-
ment were currently marketable and therefore taxable as "cash equiv-
alence," this fact would have no bearing on the discussion of the e.xist-
ence or nonexistence of the necessary control. See note 53 supra. As
pointed out in Cowden v. Commissioner, 289 F.2d 20, 23 (5th Cir. 1961),
a clear distinction should be drawn between the effect of the obligor's
willingness to make full payment at a date earlier than the contract date
and the effect of the current marketability of the promise to pay a stip-
ulated amount at a future date.
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